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INTRODUCTION
In 1995 the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) was passed. The
FTDA defined dilution as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services.”2 Before 1995, protection against
dilution was a state matter that Congress felt was inadequate “because famous
marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis . . . [and] some courts are
reluctant to grant nationwide injunctions for violation[s] of state law.”3 Later
in 2006, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) amended the FTDA and

1. J.D. Candidate at Marquette University Law School (May 2019). I would like to thank my
family for their constant support during my time in law school.
2. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2005).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995).
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explicitly provided a fair use defense to dilution for parodies.4 Notably, parody
is not available as a fair use defense when the allegedly invalid use serves as a
designation of source.5
Meaning that for the fair use parody defense to apply, the parody must not
simultaneously operate as a designation of source while acting as a parody.
However, courts have largely failed to adequately assess this. Instead, the
parody defense’s impact has been that once another’s use of the famous mark
is deemed a parody, then the famous mark holder’s dilution claim fails without
any meaningful discussion of whether the alleged diluting use is operating as a
designation of source. This is frustrating to famous mark holders because,
commercially, when trademarks are subjected to mockery or become the butt
of a joke, mark holders want to enjoin such harmful uses whenever possible. 6
Today, the TDRA parody exception is strong. Once a use is labeled “parody”
there is little opportunity for the famous mark holder to stop the use.7
Following the 2006 TDRA amendments, highly creative industries, such as
fashion, have been fighting an uphill battle to protect their trademarks that fuel
a billion-dollar industry.8 Application of the TDRA’s parody exception
showcases the law’s failure to adequately protect trademarks in highly creative
and competitive industries, such as fashion. While the FTDA sought to protect
investments in developing and sustaining famous marks that stretch across the
country from devaluation by dilution, the TDRA parody exception carved a
hole in the law for almost blanket protection of uses labeled a parody by courts
who ignore whether the parody is also a designation of source. Currently,
parody is interpreted so broadly that the TDRA’s exception makes it difficult
for trademark holders to protect their trademarks in all but extreme cases.
This comment will address how the TDRA has left famous mark holders,
particularly high-end fashion house Louis Vuitton, with little in its arsenal to
prevent others from mocking and devaluing its marks despite its worthy efforts.
Part II addresses the relationship between trademark infringement, dilution, and
parody. Part III takes a closer look at fashion giant Louis Vuitton’s strides to
protect its famous marks and the courts’ differing approaches to assessing
whether a parody exists. Part III also addresses the relationship between parody

4. Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
5. Id. at § 1125 (c)(3)(A)(ii).
6. Justin J. Gunnell, Evaluation of the Dilution-Parody Paradox in the Wake of
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 441, 442 (2008).
7. Id.
8. Joint Economic Committee, Economic Impact of the Fashion Industry, (Feb. 6, 2015)
https://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney.house.gov/files/documents/The%20Economic%20Impact%
20of%20the%20Fashion%20Industry%20—%20JEC%20report%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4RJ-ELG8].
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when it does and does not operate as a designation of source. Part IV offers a
discussion of the future implications due to the court’s treatment of the parody
exception.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADEMARK, DILUTION, AND PARODY
A. Trademark
To best understand dilution, it must first be differentiated from trademark
infringement, which in turn should be viewed in contrast to patent and
copyright infringement. Trademark infringement claims require markedly
different elements than copyright and patent infringement claims.9 In a
trademark infringement action, the plaintiff must show that consumers are
likely to be confused about a product’s source or falsely identify a product as
another’s product.10 Copyright infringement claims require a plaintiff to
establish ownership of a work and another’s unauthorized copying of that
work.11 Patent infringement requires a showing that someone used, sold, or
produced a patented work without permission.12
Copyrights and patents protect whoever possesses ownership of the
copyright or patent, whereas trademarks focus on consumer protection.13
Copyright protection seeks to encourage future creative works and patent
protection seeks to encourage future inventions.14 Copyright and patent holders
own specific works that, if not protected, may stifle incentives for future
creativity and innovation.15 In contrast, trademarks differentiate products in a
market for the sake of consumers.16 Trademarks do not seek to overtly promote
newness and creativity in the way copyright and patents operate. The goal of
trademark law is not to promote monopolistic trademarks, rather it is to sustain
the freedom and fairness of the marketplace.17 This is why trademark law
largely protects the consumer from confusion, rather than the interests of a
producer.18 Trademark law allows producers to distinguish themselves from

9.
10.
(2012).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444.
Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth And Reality Of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 212, 213
Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444.
Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444.
Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444.
Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444.
Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444.
Rierson, supra note 10 at 234-235.
Rierson, supra note 10, at 234-235.
Id.
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one another in the marketplace to prevent consumers from being tricked into
purchasing a product posing as another.
However, in passing the FTDA, Congress saw the need to protect famous
marks from their own fame.19 As a policy matter, Congress concluded that
famous marks that become so famous as to not cause customer confusion
should not be left without remedy in the law when others take advantage of
them.20 This is largely because a substantial amount of time and money are
required to develop a mark into a famous mark and such expenditures should
not be left without legal protection. By passing the FTDA, trademark dilution
became federally protected and, in contrast to trademark infringement, is
similar to copyright and patent infringement because the right is more propertylike and protects marks regardless of customer confusion.21 While trademark
infringement is inherently consumer orientated, trademark dilution law is more
producer-focused and seeks to prevent the “diminution in the value of a famous
mark.”22
B. Dilution and Parody
Dilution protects against the gradual reduction of a famous trademark’s
ability to operate as a source identifier of a producer.23 Dilution under federal
law is an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name
and a famous mark,” which either “impairs the distinctiveness of the famous
mark,” known as blurring, or “harms the reputation of the famous mark,”
known as tarnishment.24 Further, dilution law stands in direct conflict with First
Amendment speech. Some scholars go as far as to completely reject dilution
laws, arguing that they are unconstitutional.25 Dilution seeks to protect famous
marks from speech that impairs the distinctiveness of a mark, while parody is
protected First Amendment speech that legally subjects trademarks to
ridicule.26 There is a fine line between ridicule that attacks the goodwill and
reputation of a trademark that should be barred by anti-dilution statutes, and

19. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995).
20. Id.
21. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 450.
22. Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1033-34 (2006).
23. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 442.
24. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 985 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006)).
25. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone In Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law And Cognitive Science, 86
TEX. L. REV. 507, 507 (2008).
26. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 454.
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ridicule that society deems worthy of First Amendment protection of
expression as parody.27
In considering whether dilution by blurring exists courts may consider “all
relevant factors” and the FTDA provides six: (1) the degree of similarity
between the challenged mark and the famous mark; (2) the degree of
distinctiveness of the famous mark; (3) the extent to which the owner of the
famous mark is engaging in exclusive use of the mark; (4) the degree of
recognition of the famous mark; (5) whether the user of the mark or trade name
intended to create an association with the famous mark; and (6) any actual
association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.28 The FTDA
left many unanswered questions for the courts, but particularly: what
constitutes a parody? Before 2006, courts developed lengthy case law to
establish when to grant an injunction against a parody in the absence of
confusion.29 Courts weighed a multitude of factors including the interests of
the public, interests of mark holders, and commercial implications in making
their decisions.30 After 2006, with the passing of the TDRA, the inquiry
became much more brief because the TDRA explicitly provided for a fair use
exception including “parodying.”31
After 2006, courts simply asked whether the dilutive activity constituted a
parody. If yes a parody is found, the court asks whether the parody is being
used as a source identifier.32 If the parody does not operate as a source
identifier, then the fair use defense triggers and a dilution action cannot be
sustained.33 The TDRA does not define parody, and in practice parody has been
interpreted broadly. Overwhelmingly, courts hold that an attempt at humor
alongside another’s trademark is parody.34 Some minority courts do not
confine parody to humor, but rather to works that comment upon another by
offering a critique, juxtaposing, or mimicking the work.35 Due to the language
of the statute combined with court interpretations, the parody exception is
powerful. If a use is deemed a parody, while not operating as a source
27. Gunnerll, supra note 6, at 454.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
29. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987); Mattel, Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F.
Supp. 2d 942 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994);
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc. 41 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1994); N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc. v. N.Y.,
N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002).
30. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
32. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 463.
33. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 463.
34. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 466.
35. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 465.
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identifier, famous mark holders will have no remedy for lesser marks coattailing off their fame. This remains the principle issue: the courts’ superficial
and subjective means of determining when parody exists and whether it
operates as a designation of source.
II. THE FASHION INDUSTRY
The twentieth century generated most of the world’s famous fashion
brands. Throughout the last century fashion proved to be a booming and
competitive industry. In 2015, consumers spent roughly $380 billion on
apparel and footwear in the United States alone.36 While many fashion trends
come and go there are some brands that have withstood the test of time, such
as: Chanel, Dior, Ralph Lauren, Louis Vuitton, and Burberry, to name a few.
These fashion houses are mainstays; they hold a perpetual place in high-end
fashion.
A. Limited Legal Protections for Fashion
Fashion presents an interesting challenge within intellectual property law
about how to best protect the fluid, organic nature of the work. Fashion trends
build on each other, old becomes new again, and ideas are often recycled.
“Sleeves, collars, skirt lengths, patterns, fabrics, buttons and hems all are
elements with seemingly infinite permutations, but in reality there is a fairly
limited aesthetic vocabulary.”37 The cyclical nature of the industry encourages
designers to acknowledge sources and inspirations from the past or other
designers.38 While some may argue that the lack of intellectual property rights
in fashion drives the industry, most scholars and designers agree that without
legal protections, designers and manufacturers are more reluctant to take
chances, thus stifling the industry.39 Copyright and patent provide little
protection for fashion. Generally, copyrights are not granted to clothing, as
they are “useful articles,” not works of art.40 Design patents require a showing
36. Joint Economic Committee, The Economic Impact of the Fashion Industry,
https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/66dba6df-e3bd-42b4-a795-436d194ef08a/fashion—september-2016-final-090716.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U2S-F895].
37. Aram Sinnreich & Marissa Gluck, Music & Fashion: The Balancing Act Between Creativity
and
Control,
THE
NORMAN
LEAR
CENTER,
6
(Jan.
29,
2005),
http://learcenter.org/pdf/RTSSinnreichGluck.pdf [https://perma.cc/H82L-XPEC].
38. Id.
39. Erica S. Schwartz, Red With Envy: Why the Fashion Industry Should Embrace ADR as a
Viable Solution to Resolving Trademark Disputes, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL., 279, 281 (2012).
40. Christine Cox & Jennifer Jenkins, Between the Seams, A Fertile Commons: An Overview
of the Relationship Between Fashion and Intellectual Property, THE NORMAN LEAR CENTER, 16 (Jan.
29, 2005), http:// learcenter.org/pdf/RTSJenkinsCox.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SAW-FRKS]. See also
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1004 (2017), which called into question
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of novelty and nonobviousness that are difficult to achieve in clothing design.41
The best source of protection for fashion houses is trademark law, which does
not protect the overall design, but does protect brand names, logos, and other
registered marks.42
Trademark law protects “any word, name, symbol, or device” distinctive of
a designer to identify the source and manufacturer of a given article of
clothing.43 Trademark provides the essential service of protecting the highly
valuable fashion brand name. As the fashion industry expands and new
designers enter the market, branding strength is essential to ensure a company’s
success and survival in today’s economy.44 Many high-end fashion brands are
particularly concerned with instantaneous copycats of its products made with
lower quality materials that only seek to profit off the success of its famous
mark. High-end fashion houses with strong customer bases aggressively
protect brand names and logos. While trademark law does not protect the
article of clothing itself, the tag or logo identifies to the consumer who produced
the product. Logos and other marks are principally the only means fashion
brands have to assure customers that upon purchase they receive the quality and
prestige they expect to coincide with the designer.45
Protecting the marks of high-end fashion brands is precisely the type of
protection contemplated in passing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(FTDA), which sought to protect famous marks from slowly losing
distinctiveness and becoming worthless.46 But, just as fashion brands are
protected by the FTDA, they are also subject to the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act’s (TDRA) post-2006 parody exception. Thus, when non-mark
holders employ famous marks to mimic and mock, there is little protection in
the law if a court finds there is a parody. This on its face is not a problem
because after all parody has been codified in the law as an exception. Tensions
arise when courts insufficiently address whether the parody is operating as a
designation of source. Notably, Louis Vuitton is one fashion house that actively

whether the well-established idea that clothing designs could never be copyrighted was true. Later the
U.S. Copyright Office clarified that clothing was not copyrightable. COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE PRACTICES, § 311.1 (3d ed. 2017)
41. Cox, supra note 40 at 6.
42. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 281-82.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
44. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 289-90.
45. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 289-90.
46. Patents: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., (1932) (statement of Frank
Schechter).
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seeks to protect its invaluable logo from attacks of parody, to little avail in
court.47
B. Louis Vuitton
1. Parody Protects “Chewy Vuiton” Dog Toys
In 2007, Louis Vuitton, known for producing luxury luggage, handbags,
and accessories, brought suit for trademark dilution against Haute Diggity Dog
for producing dog toys labeled “Chewy Vuiton,” imitating Louis Vuitton
handbags.48 The court determined Louis Vuitton’s trademark was famous and
distinct, even noting the brand was ranked the 17th “best brand” of all
corporations in the world.49 Louis Vuitton holds many registered trademarks
in connection with luggage and handbags including their original LV
monogram since 1896.50 The dog chew toys were modeled after a medium
sized handbag selling for $1,190 containing Louis Vuitton’s Multicolor
trademark.51 Between 2003 and 2005, Louis Vuitton “spent more than $48
million advertising products using its marks and designs, including more than
$4 million for the Multicolor design.”52 The “Chewy Vuitton” toy possessed
similar shape, design, and color as the real life handbags, but in lieu of the Louis
Vuitton interlocking “LV” they used “CV.”53
The lower court ultimately ruled in favor of Haute Diggity Dog finding a
parody, and subsequently barred a dilution claim.54 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, but reached its conclusion through a different analysis.55 The Fourth
Circuit began “by noting that parody is not automatically a complete defense to
a claim of dilution by blurring where the defendant uses the parody as its own
designation of source.”56 The Fourth Circuit noted that even though the
Trademark Dilution Revisions Act (TDRA) allows fair use as a defense, parody
only qualifies for that fair use defense when the trademark is not being used as

47. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F.Supp.2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006),
aff’d on other grounds, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag,
156 F.Supp.3d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
48. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 at 256.
49. Id. at 257.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 258.
54. Id. at 267.
55. Id. at 257.
56. Id. at 266.
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a designation of source.57 Where a defendant parodies a famous mark and that
parody operates as a designation of source, no fair use protection is available.58
The Fourth Circuit’s decision makes clear that the existence of a parody
does not instantly bar a court from considering whether dilution exists and
allows a court to consider “all relevant factors” within the statute.59 For
example, factor (v) “whether the defendant intended to create an association
with the famous mark” and factor (vi) “whether there exists an actual
association between the defendant’s mark and the famous mark” both question
the parody’s purpose and whether it contributes to dilution.60 Furthermore,
factors (i), (ii), and (iv) focus on the similarly between the mark and the
parody.61 Ultimately, the court stated that, “a defendant’s use of a parody . . .
may be considered in determining whether the plaintiff-owner of a famous
mark has proved its claim that the defendant’s use of a parody mark is likely to
impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”62 Louis Vuitton lost in Haute
Diggity Dog, but the Fourth Circuit made clear that parodies between products
more similar than a dog chew toy and luxury handbag may not qualify for the
fair use parody defense provided in the TDRA.63
2. My Other Bag Business Model Also Protected by Parody
In early 2016, a New York district court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant My Other Bag (MOB) against Louis Vuitton for trademark
dilution, which was affirmed on all counts by the Second Circuit.64 MOB sells
canvas tote bags with the phrase “My Other Bag” on one side and iconic
designer handbags depicted on the other, including a classic Louis Vuitton
design.65 Louis Vuitton holds many trademarks including its classic repeating
pattern design featuring the letters L and V interlocking with three stylized
flowers.66 MOB sells totes mimicking Louis Vuitton’s iconic trademarked
design, but replaces the interlocking “LV” with “MOB” for “My Other Bag.”67
The Second Circuit held that MOB’s totes constituted a parody and was
protected as fair use because MOB “is poking fun,” “invites an amusing
57. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). ((A) Any fair use . . . other than as a designation of source
for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with . . . parodying).
58. Id.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B); Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 at 266.
60. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 at 267.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d 425, 430 (2016).
65. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d at 431.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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comparison,” and the tote playfully suggests that while wealthy individuals take
great care of their Louis Vuitton handbags MOB totes are for sweaty gym
clothes.68 The court also concluded that MOB’s use of Louis Vuitton’s marks
was not a designation of source because of the products’ dissimilarities.69 In
contrast, Louis Vuitton argued that the association is too great, and the parody
that MOB employs is not against Louis Vuitton, but the joke is a larger societal
mockery between wealth and utility perpetuated at the expense of its highly
valuable and aggressively protected trademarks.70
Louis Vuitton relied on an unpublished opinion from the same district court,
where Hyundai aired a commercial featuring a basketball with markings meant
to invoke Louis Vuitton’s trademarks.71 The Hyundai court rejected Hyundai’s
parody defense because Hyundai representatives testified clearly stating that
Hyundai had no intention to compare or comment on Louis Vuitton, but rather
intended to make a “broader social comment” about “what it means for a
product to be luxurious.”72 Like Hyundai’s company representatives, MOB’s
Chief Executive Officer stated that she never intended to disparage Louis
Vuitton itself.73 MOB’s website explains that its totes are simply meant to be
stylish.74 Therefore, Louis Vuitton argued that the totes did not parody Louis
Vuitton itself because MOB had no intention to criticize or comment upon
them, but only to make a larger societal point at Louis Vuitton’s own expense.75
Furthermore, Louis Vuitton argued its marks were not necessary for MOB
to get its point across; instead MOB’s use of Louis Vuitton’s mark simply
dilutes the brand.76 MOB could easily make tote bags that are stylish and
practical without utilizing famous marks to generate sales. Nonetheless, the
court declined to extend its reasoning in Hyundai, ruling that even though the
totes convey a message greater than Louis Vuitton itself, MOB’s use of Louis
Vuitton’s mark is an “integral part of the joke” even though the bags do not
exclusively mock Louis Vuitton.77 Thus, Louis Vuitton failed again to find a
legal remedy to protect its trademarks from being employed by lesser brands to
generate association and sell product.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 437-38.
70. Id. at 435.
71. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10–CV–1611 (PKC), 2012 WL
1022247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
72. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d at 436.
73. Id. at 435.
74. Behind the Bag. MY OTHER BAG (last visited Nov. 21, 2019)
https://www.myotherbag.com/pages/about-us [https://perma.cc/4RN3-5VTZ].
75. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d at 435.
76. Id. at 437.
77. Id. at 436.
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3. Louis Vuitton’s Unsuccessful Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court
Following My Other Bag, Louis Vuitton filed an unsuccessful petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court to resolve the contrasting
approaches between the Fourth Circuit’s Haute Diggity Dog and Second
Circuit’s My Other Bag decisions.78 Louis Vuitton urged the Supreme Court
“to establish a nationally uniform test for identifying parody in dilution cases,
to restore the careful balance between trademark protections and First
Amendment rights . . . [and] to prevent the widespread, irreversible devaluation
of famous marks.”79 Additionally, Louis Vuitton argued that MOB would not
have survived the standards set in the Fourth Circuit’s Haute Diggity Dog case
if the Second Circuit applied it.80
The Fourth Circuit concluded the chew toys constituted a parody because
they were first obviously an imitation,81 second the differences between the
products were plainly apparent,82 and third the joke was immediate.83 Holding
that the two products were so different that the dog chew toy parody was clearly
not operating as a designation of source. Even though the Second Circuit
sought to apply the same standard as the Fourth Circuit, Louis Vuitton argued
that in fact, the Haute Diggity Dog standard is far more rigorous than that
applied in My Other Bag.84 The Second Circuit’s analysis began similarly to
the Fourth Circuit’s by determining that MOB imitates Louis Vuitton because
the totes are shaped like a handbag and the repetitious monogram is clearly
mimicking Louis Vuitton’s mark.85 Louis Vuitton asserted that the similarities
in the two courts’ approaches conclude there, due to how the Second Circuit
first analyzed the association between the products and second the existence of
a joke.86
The Fourth Circuit placed great weight on the fact that the chew toys were
inherently different than a Louis Vuitton handbag.87 Whereas, the Second
78. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, petition for cert. filed, 2017
WL 3034216 (U.S. July 13, 2017); Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, 2017
WL 3036727 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).138 S.Ct. 221 (Mem), 199 L.Ed.2d 120, 86 USLW 3147, 86 USLW
3154 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id.
81. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 260-61.
84. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, petition for cert. filed, 2017
WL 3034216 (U.S. July 13, 2017).
85. Id. at 21-22.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id.
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Circuit also concluded the products were markedly different, but placed no
significance on the fact that the products were both handbags, with virtually
identical designs, and marketed to similar women that seek stylish,
sophisticated, and versatile bags.88 The Fourth Circuit emphasized the
fundamental distinctions between a crude dog chew toy and a high-end
handbag.89 The Second Circuit ignored the comparable characteristics of the
two handbags and instead distinguished the more nuanced characteristics of
each company’s bags.90 The Second Circuit appears to conclude MOB’s
concept of luxury versus utility rendered its product plainly distinguishable
from Louis Vuitton’s notoriously expensive product.91
Louis Vuitton understandably disagreed. MOB sought to sell fashionable
tote bags by latching onto the prestige and quality that Louis Vuitton spent
millions of dollars to generate and continues to spend millions to maintain. By
parodying Louis Vuitton’s marks, MOB purposely sought to create an
association between the products to gain the attention of fashion savvy
purchasers. MOB simply sells tote bags; what makes MOB’s tote bags special
is that they depict high-end trademarks on one side.92 Louis Vuitton’s
trademarks convey to a purchaser that their purchase possess quality, makes a
statement, and is fancier than other bags. The Fourth Circuit’s discussion as to
whether MOB’s products operate as a designation of source, which would
nullify MOB’s ability to employ a fair use parody defense, is lacking.
Furthermore, each circuit addressed whether a joke existed differently. The
Second Circuit focused on jokes being “immediately conveyed,” because a
Louis Vuitton handbag as a chewable dog toy clearly established that the chew
toy sought to be funny and concluded that a parody existed.93 The Second
Circuit interpreted jokes as more subtle, a “juxtaposition of similar and
dissimilar” without any requirement to immediately convey the joke.94 The
Second Circuit acknowledged that some people might not even recognize that
a joke was conveyed, and that was not an impediment of parody.95 “The fact

88. Id. at 22.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 23.
92. My
Other
Bag,
The
Collection,
(Jan.,
30,
2019)
https://www.myotherbag.com/collections/my-other-bag/products/zoey-tonal-browns
[https://perma.cc/KVK6-QUKM]. Note that on MOB’s website when given the option to view the bag
the side depicting the high-fashion brands is the primary focus. To view the other side of the bag the
viewer must scroll down and select a separate photo.
93. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, petition for cert. filed, at 24.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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that the joke on [Louis Vuitton’s] luxury image is gentle, and possibly even
complimentary . . . does not preclude it from being a parody.”96
Overall, Louis Vuitton’s position was that the Fourth Circuit’s test should
have been applied and the Second Circuit’s approach was incorrect because the
inherent similarities between the handbags were far too great and there was no
immediately apparent joke. Arguing that the Second Circuit was required to
conclude no parody existed.97 The Second Circuit’s approach to parody was
very expansive and conflicts with the test utilized by the Fourth Circuit.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s rejection of Louis Vuitton’s writ showcases
another instance of the fashion giant attempting and failing to protect its marks
by preventing lesser brands from making a mockery of and utilizing its highly
valuable trademarks to establish their own products.
4. Parodies in the Past and Today
My Other Bag exemplifies how expansive the current application of the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act can be to protect would-be infringing uses
when they are labeled a parody.98 Parody absolved MOB’s use of Louis
Vuitton’s marks, even though the CEO affirmatively stated her products were
not a critique, and how they instead essentially utilize famous designs to create
association with the famous brands and develop its own brand.99
Parody’s definition has evolved over time. Parody is derived from the
Greek word parōidia, meaning “a song sung alongside another.”100 The
American Heritage Dictionary defines parody as a “literary or artistic work that
imitates the characteristic style of an author or work for comic effect or
ridicule.”101 In 1994, the Supreme Court discussed how non-critical
commentary on another’s work, merely used to gain attention, diminishes the
would-be infringer’s fair use claim. Further stating that “parody needs to
mimic” their victim’s creation to make their point.102 Other courts defined
parody as a, “humorous or satirical imitation of a work of art,”103 a work that
seeks to comment upon or criticize another work by appropriating elements of

96. Id.
97. Id. at 24-25.
98. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d 425 (2016).
99. See id.
100. 7 Encyclopedia Britannica 768 (15th ed. 1975).
101. American Heritage Dictionary 1317 (3d ed. 1992).
102. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct 1164, 1172 (1994) (discussing parody in
the context of copyright infringement, which is commonly equated to the same property interests in
trademark dilution).
103. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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the original104 or “a work in which the language or style of another work is
closely imitated or mimicked for comic effect or ridicule.”105 Many definitions
required an attempt at humor or critical commentary to presumptively
constitute a parody.106 Even though past courts applied varying parody
definitions, the Second Circuit’s conclusion in My Other Bag is notably
expansive.107 The definition of parody in My Other Bag included “gentle” and
even “complimentary” comparisons.108
MOB seeks to sell women high-end canvas tote bags through acquiring a
prideful feeling of refinement by utilizing famous trademarks of high-end
fashion houses, such as Louis Vuitton. As mentioned, MOB’s CEO herself
stated that Louis Vuitton’s bags were iconic and she never intended to criticize
Louis Vuitton.109 Additionally, MOB markets to stylish women. MOB does
not want its customers met with giggles when they walk down the street
because they hold a humorous bag. The company markets its product as a
fashionable bag for everyday use.110 The bag depicting Louis Vuitton’s classic
design, invokes general notions of Louis Vuitton’s stylishness and expensive
products to appeal to women willing to pay roughly $40 to look sophisticated,
even when walking around with a canvas tote bag.111 MOB blatantly utilizes
Louis Vuitton’s highly valuable trademarks to perpetuate an association with a
more expensive caliber of handbag. Louis Vuitton has no legal remedy due to
parody being expanded so greatly as to include “gentle” and even
“complimentary” comparisons.112
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Historically, litigation in the fashion industry is risky.113 The fashion
industry is fast paced because the seasons shift regularly and popular trends
constantly fluctuate.114 Simultaneously, the court system is notoriously slow
104. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2001).
105. New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc. 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1525
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1979)).
106. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 465.
107. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, , petition for cert. filed, 2017
WL 3034216 (U.S. July 13, 2017).
108. Id. at 3.
109. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d 425, 435 (2016).
110. https://www.myotherbag.com/pages/about-us [https://perma.cc/4RN3-5VTZ].
111. https://www.myotherbag.com/collections/my-other-bag
[https://perma.cc/KVK6QUKM].
112. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d at 445.
113. Schwartz, supra note 39 at 296-98.
114. Id. at 297-98.
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with litigation sometimes lasting years, which causes court decisions to have
minimal effect.115 Trademark disputes are somewhat unique because protecting
a trademark is often in the fashion houses’ long-term interest.116 However,
trademark disputes still pose practical drawbacks in the form of costs as well as
disrupting business relationships because the industry is so fluid with talented
individuals, ideas, and designs constantly recirculating.117
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is one option for fashion houses to
avoid litigation because many innate characteristics of ADR appeal to the
fashion industry.118 For example, parties are more likely to be able to design
their own solutions and continue to work and grow together because ADR is
generally less confrontational and more constructive.119 This is important
because the fashion industry is so collaborative and companies that drag each
other through litigation run the risk of damaging future business relationships.
The public nature of litigation is also an added consideration for famous
marks because by bringing suits against smaller producers they are bolstering
the notoriety of the smaller entity. For example, some consider My Other Bag
a “victim” of Louis Vuitton’s imperialistic protection of its trademark. Some
commentators went as far as labeling Louis Vuitton a “trademark bully.” 120
Louis Vuitton’s My Other Bag lawsuit put My Other Bag’s name alongside the
fashion giant in headlines at the risk of causing traffic to MOB’s website and
possibly increasing MOB’s sales. Even with knowledge of such risks, Louis
Vuitton’s commitment to seeking protection for its marks through litigation
likely is not over. The fashion house’s passion to enforce its trademark rights
in court is a testament to how valuable its trademarks are to the brand and the
lengths it will go to protect the marks.
CONCLUSION
Louis Vuitton’s failure to prevent companies like Haute Diggity Dog and
My Other Bag from utilizing its marks evidences a concerning trend towards
courts’ willingness to expand parody to render dilution protection of famous
marks generally ineffective. The Fourth and Second Circuit’s holdings leave
future lawyers with conflicting ideas of what constitutes a parody and
legitimate concerns about whether to initiate dilution litigation if parody could
be raised as a defense. Moreover, the TDRA’s application impacts the fashion
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
VC5J].

Id.
See id.
Id.
Schwartz, supra note 39 at 299.
Id.
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/bagging-a-trademark-bully/

[https://perma.cc/86DV-
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industry more negatively than other industries because there are already so few
legal options to protect their business interests.121 Lastly, recall that consumer
confusion is not a concern in assessing whether dilution exists. Again, “the
purpose behind anti-dilution laws is not to avoid consumer confusion, but
rather, to promote a property-like interest in the mark itself.”122 This propertylike interest is weak, and even when courts are willing to find that a parody
exists they are unclear as to what constitutes source designation. The broad
application of what constitutes a parody and whether it operates as a designation
of source leaves famous mark holders, particularly high-end fashion houses like
Louis Vuitton, with few options to prevent others from mocking and devaluing
its marks despite its worthy efforts.

121. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 281-82.
122. Jordan M. Blanke, Victor’s Little Secret: Supreme Court Decision Means More Protection
for Trademark Parody, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1053, 1061 (citing Moseley
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2003)).

